Bertrand Russell…pffff

Russell’s conjecture that there are two types of knowledge is not altogether new; however, his application of the outcome of this description has far flung implications. Knowledge by acquaintance (things like color, temperature, size, sweet) is much like G.E. Moore’s description of the color yellow. While many things can be said about the color yellow, none of the things said about yellow can adequately convey what yellow is; in the same way, Russell describes this level of knowledge as acquaintance. He describes this acquaintance as the only way to know the thing itself. According to Russell, this is to know the thing through experiencing the thing itself. Thus as Russell says, “nothing said makes me know any better then before.”

Conversely, knowledge by description (desk, lamp, desk lamp, dog) portrays something by means of sense data available based on the individual truths pertaining to the thing that causes the sense data. As such, knowledge by description is the concatenation of all the data points of knowledge by acquaintance in one thing that is known. Russell gives the example of a desk. The desk is composed of multiple knowledge data points (color, size, etc etc) which composed form the description of a desk. Russell summarizes this by stating that “every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted.”

Through breaking down large groupings of knowledge, for instance a desk, into its constituent parts, one is able to establish a firm ground for believing that the desk is in fact a desk and not something else. Since knowledge through acquaintance cannot be further deconstructed and stands by itself, it is a firmer ground for Russell to base truths on then something more conceptual like a desk. The distinction then, between description and acquaintance, demonstrates those things which are known based on groupings of prior experience and those things which are known as they are at that moment. Thus, theoretically, the knowledge of a desk could be misinterpreted for being a chair, but brown cannot be misinterpreted for being yellow.

In either case and at a certain point one must be taught that yellow is yellow and not brown. One only knows the difference between the two by instruction. Furthermore, a desk is only known as a desk through similar pedagogical methods. Russell’s formula only seems to work if one assumes a fully formed human with the requisite knowledge to do such analysis. Otherwise, he cannot account for the process of knowing and coming to that knowledge. Is yellow, as we know yellow, the same color to a one year old before she is taught that it is in fact bright, like the sun, warm, happy, etc etc? One will never know.

 

Separation and Abstraction?

Tags

Aquinas, Aristotle, Metaphysics, Natural science, Plato, Thomas, Thomas Aquinas, Thomism

Separation and abstraction, as methods of analysis of that which is, are used by Aquinas to address both natural science and mathematics as points of reference for metaphysical inquiry. Aquinas also uses these methods in combating perceived issues in Platonic and Neo-Platonist thought.  Separation and abstraction are both modes of consideration by which sensible things may be understood and examined in order to move towards metaphysical knowledge from the sensible world. As defined, abstraction is to consider apart that which cannot exist apart. This methodological approach using separation and abstraction is a critical modern difference from other approaches to metaphysics and epistemology as it specifically demands that there is knowledge to be gained from the sensible world AND that the beginning of knowledge exists apart from man in the world.

Thomas has another target in this discussion beyond the differentiation of abstraction and separation and their application to natural science and mathematics.  Plato looms larger than life in all of the discussion of Aristotle on this topic. The issues of forms, intermediate classes and sensible objects present difficulties for Aristotle that must be dealt with first as philosophical patrimony that must be addressed before more philosophical heavy lifting can be accomplished; then, Aristotle can move onto the project at hand defining Metaphysics. Aristotle posits in Questions Concerning the Method of This Science “It is also necessary to inquire whether sensible substances alone must be said to exist, or whether there are other substances in addition to these; and whether they are unique, or whether there are many classes of substances…” Thomas comments that Platonists held a twofold abstraction from universal to particular with regards to sensible objects and another for mathematical objects. Since Aristotle finds the concept of forms disagreeable, he must first address why an intermediate state of forms in mathematics is unacceptable and secondly why the concept of Mathematics must exist in sensible reality. By thus defining mathematics, and demonstrating that the idea of intermediate forms is unacceptable, Aristotle can demonstrate in separation and abstraction that the sensible world leads to the metaphysical.

In natural science and metaphysics, Thomas’ differentiation between “flesh and bones and these flesh and bones” is necessary to understand how abstraction plays a part in understanding the critical differences between natural science and metaphysics. The approach to natural science by Thomas then: “…the things studied by natural philosophy depend on matter to both exist and to be understood. Hence we discover the subject of this science by an abstraction of the whole, that is, abstracting something universal from the individuating conditions of matter.” In order for this approach to be workable, one must have sense perceptions of the physical matter and abstract form “these flesh and bones” something about all flesh and bones. This abstraction becomes universal concerning all “flesh and bones.”  Mathematics approaches the physical world differently than natural science, as mathematics “depend[s] on matter to exist, but [mathematics] depend[s] on sensible matter (matter as it is grasped by the external senses) in order to be defined.” Mathematics derives from the “accidental form of quantities” something about the subject. In order to do so, mathematics must at some level be based on the quantifiable. The quantifiable must, by definition be sensible matter. While geometry can envision a perfect spheroid apart from the created order, the concept of a spheroid is still based on the reality of sphere existing in the created reality. Mathematics both in its theory and its application is bound to the created order, as it is, exactly the thing that Aquinas is attempting to transcend. In both mathematics and natural science (or philosophy) matter must exist in order for something intelligibly to be said about it and its value. It must be sensible.  Mathematics would then be the abstraction of the forms of an object from its accidents making the thing itself intelligible by mathematics.

Thomas addresses this point in “On There Being Only One Intellect.” Thomas argues that while the intellect can perceive the rock as heavy, it only perceives the rocks weight, or the apple’s taste, through senses, it does not tell us anything about the intellect itself. It is for Thomas, understanding the intellect perceiving that the sense data can be separated from the subject of the apple or rock where one can approach the immaterial intellect from the material. Wippel has described Thomas’ approach as “one recognizes that being, in order to be realized as such, need not be material, changing, quantified, and so forth. By eliminating all such restrictions [separation] from one’s understanding of being, one is justified in thinking of being as being.” The Thomistic scholar, Dr. Leo Elders, defines Thomistic separation “in order to study common being one must set it free from its materiality. Simple abstraction is not adequate because one cannot abstract forms which in reality are dependant on and remain identical with that from which they are being abstracted…the insight that not every being is material.” So, Thomistic separation considers apart those things that cannot exist apart materially and separation examines those things that cannot be separated fundamentally.

In order to understand why Thomas defines “abstraction” and “separation” as he does when understanding the differences between metaphysics, mathematics and natural sciences, it is helpful to examine the differences Thomas perceives between theology and metaphysics. The reason for this is that Thomas approaches all of these topics both as mutually coherent and as forming a corpus of understanding of the created order and the spiritual order. Thomas separates theology and metaphysics, writing “There are then two kinds of divine science, one, in which divine things are not considered as the subject of the science, but as principles of the subject, which philosophers pursue and which is known as metaphysics, and another, which considers divine things themselves as the subject of the science, and this is the theology which is handed down in Sacred Scripture.” Here Thomas has outlined the project of metaphysics as specifically differentiated from theology. To distinguish theology from metaphysics is important as Thomas approaches the distinguishing characteristics of metaphysics and mathematics and natural science he thus brackets theology to prevent any misunderstanding of the topic. In doing so, Thomas has ensured that sacred scripture does not color the metaphysical project. If theology had an influence on metaphysics, the relationship between metaphysics and the physical sciences would be, in a sense, corrupted. This would bring an element of faith into the coherent understanding of philosophy and theology into question. It thus becomes important to understand the qualitative and quantitative differences between the two in approaching the more sensual aspects of mathematics and natural science. Thus having bracketed “divine substances” from metaphysics and natural science, the differences between metaphysics, natural science and mathematics becomes more apparent.

Thomas defines abstraction as considering those things that cannot be considered apart. Abstraction considers universals in order to say something meaningful apart from the object specifically. Separation, alternatively, seeks to understand the mind understanding since one cannot abstract forms that cannot exist apart from one another. Natural science and mathematics provide starting points for Aquinas to move towards, in generality, the ability to say something meaningful about being as being. It is only through abstraction and separation of the sensible material world, and the linkages of natural science and mathematics to that world that Thomas is able to accomplish his task.  This brings Thomas back to starting apart from man in the sensible world in order to understand being as being. What makes this methodological approach unique and important is that man is not the staring point, as in Descartes. Thomas uses the tools of separation and abstraction in order to understand the world apart from man. Using these tools he moves seamlessly through mathematics and natural science towards metaphysics. The ability for man to depend on his perceptions of the sensible world is critical for Thomas to move from sense data towards that knowledge he seeks in the metaphysical project. It is through the use of abstraction and separation in natural science and mathematics that Thomas achieves this task.

Metaphysics: Theology or Ontology?

Tags

Aquinas, Aristotle, Augustine of Hippo, God, John Calvin, Metaphysics, Ontology, Thomas Aquinas

To attempt to define whether metaphysics is ontology or theology is to enter into a discussion so filled with fault lines and hidden problem sets that no mere dictionary definition will suffice. Starting with a dictionary can present definitions that seem to violate the rule of “begging the question.” One would almost think that people do not rightly know what, if any, difference there is between the two words. Turning to a theological dictionary, one is presented with these two definitions:

 

Theology: Language or discourse about God. It can be scientific, methodological attempt to understand God’s divine revelation. It has been classically seen as “faith seeking understanding.”

 

Ontology: The philosophical study of being as being. It is thus the study of underlying principals which are present in all things that exist solely by virtue of existing.

 

These two definitions do not lead anyone with regard to metaphysics. While the definition of ontology looks suspiciously like Aristotle, it leaves out the understanding of the divine that Aristotle finishes Metaphysics with. Alternatively, the definition of theology does not seem to capture the theological implications of metaphysics found in Aquinas or Aristotle from their studies of metaphysics. Webster’s dictionary takes a one-sided stand on the issue declaring that ontology and metaphysics is the same thing. Where as Webster’s seems, like the theological dictionary to get confused with theology defining it as knowledge of God and the supernatural.

Where Aquinas makes this definition difficult is his separation of theology proper from sacred scripture. Because Aquinas does not make them a singular study the definition becomes more difficult to grasp at, as opposed to thinkers like John Calvin and Augustine of Hippo who see a more hardened connection between sacred scripture and theology. It thus becomes necessary to define these terms before we can declare one as being metaphysics and the other lacking.

Aquinas separates the theology of sacred scripture and philosophical theology thus: “there is no reason why those things treated by the philosophical disciplines through natural reason should not also be treated by another science insofar as they are known by the light of divine revelation. Thus the theology which pertains to sacred doctrine differs from that theology which is a part of philosophy.” So, Aquinas has two theologies, one is associated specifically with sacred scripture and the other philosophical theology. Further elaborated by Aquinas in Exposition of Boethius’ On the Trinity:  “Thus it is that divine science or theology is of two kinds, one in which divine things are considered not as the subject of the science but as principles of the subject and this is the theology that the philosophers pursue, also called metaphysics. The other considers divine things in themselves as the subject of the science, and this is the theology which is treated in Sacred Scripture. They are both concerned with things which exist separately from matter and motion, but differently…” But what is this philosophical theology he is driving at and why would he create such a difference? Part of the answer is tied up in Aquinas’ view of the noetic capabilities of man. Since, for Aquinas, knowledge of God as God is obtainable by man through the use of metaphysics, man can obtain right knowledge of God that would fit the theological dictionary definition above, that is, accurate theological discourse concerning God is possible for Aquinas apart from sacred scripture.  Thus while the theology of sacred scripture specifically requires divine revelation and special knowledge apart from the senses of man, philosophic theology, is according to Aquinas, attainable by all men to a certain degree. Thus, we are left with two theologies, the theology of sacred scripture that is tied specifically to revelation from God composed of special knowledge apart from the senses and philosophic theology, which is bound by rules and interactions through the sense datum. This second kind of theology is the competitor with ontology for nomination as the definition of metaphysics.

Ontology, to return to the theological dictionary, is the study of being as being, the ens commune. Aquinas defines the ontological sense of metaphysics in his commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics “it [metaphysics]  must be the office of one in the same science to consider separate substances and being in general (ens commune) which is the genus of which the substances mentioned above are common and universal causes.” Here Aquinas seems to turn away from philosophic theology and return to the ontological aspect of metaphysics of being as being and ens commune. Ens commune is a common term and reoccurring theme concerning metaphysics for Aquinas and Aristotle. Taken literally, it means a thing shared, that thing is the common being of the items in question. Ontology then looks at all things and their common substance and common existence.

Ontology leads inexorably to God taken to its logical extent, that is back to theology. But then is the natural out come of ontology seen in the last pages of Aristotle’s metaphysics the defining attribute of the metaphysics making metaphysics a theology? The answer is still not clear since it is by ontology that Aristotle and Aquinas arrive at any kind of theology to begin with. That is, it would seem that in order to have metaphysics, first one must have an understanding of ontology. From this understanding of ontology, one will develop an understanding of philosophic theology contingent on the principals of ontology. Aquinas points towards this understanding in his commentary on Aristotle’s metaphysics when he dissects Aristotle’s understanding of the theology-ontology disagreement. “Second, he [Aristotle] gives two reasons why this science is called a theology. The first of these is that ‘it is obvious that if the divine exists anywhere,’ i.e., if something divine exists in any class of things, in exists in such a nature, namely, in the class of being which is immobile and separate from matter, which this science studies.” Aquinas demonstrates here that the only way to understand the theology is to first understand “…this class of being which is immobile and separate from matter…”  However, assumed is that the ontology is what gets you there…to the class of being.

Thus, it appears that by reducing the question to the methodology metaphysics is ontology with theological outcomes. Metaphysics needs ontology in order to produce theology. The process whereby Aquinas moves from sense data to substance to being to God is ontology, the theology, though it rests at the back of Aristotle’s Metaphysics is by no means the only conclusion one could take from the book, nor is metaphysics contingent on theology. While the product in this instance is in fact theology at the linear end of Aristotle’s metaphysics, examination of a host of other topics would not necessarily be contingent on the appearance of theology. Ontology moves towards theology but is not contingent on theology in order to be meaningful.  Aquinas gave “the science which we seek” three aspects: theology, metaphysics and first philosophy. However, it seems apparent that these aspects are not the defining nature of metaphysics itself, and Aquinas here specifically splits metaphysics off from theology. “It is called metaphysics inasmuch as it considers being and the attributes which naturally accompany being (for things which transcend the physical order are discovered by the process of analysis, as the more common are discovered after the less common).” So, even for Aquinas Metaphysics is separate from theology and there is an analysis that produces metaphysic conclusions apart from the theological aspects of metaphysics. Metaphysics is ontology.

“The philosophical differences between Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas”

Tags

Aquinas, Aristotle, Christianity, God, Joseph Owens, Metaphysics, Sentences, Thomas Aquinas

Aristotle and Aquinas have been equivocated by many philosophers and theologians due to the symmetry of their respective philosophies. This treatment of these two philosophers does an injustice to their work as it forces Aristotle into a Thomistic shape and Aquinas into an Aristotelian shape; however, in both cases, the forms of their philosophies are two different to fit the respective shapes. In some cases the similarity may only be in the words that are used. Upon a deeper examination the appearance of substantial differences come to light that point to dissimilarities that make Aquinas and Aristotle less of a hyphenated philosophy and more like cobelligerents in similar streams of thinking.

Joseph Owens, in an essay in the Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, examines some of the substantial differences between the two philosophers that demonstrate the cleavages.[1] In the examples provided by Owens, the differences are not obvious by a prima facie examination of the texts but require a systemic examination of the texts; that is, Aquinas and Aristotle seem to demonstrate symmetries because of the proximate outcomes of their philosophies, starting points and vocabularies. However, their differences lie both in their presuppositions and where they go with their philosophies as well as where they end up. In most cases, the differences lie in the fact that Aquinas had some place to go in continuing down a road that Aristotle saw no need to continue down precisely because of his Grecian theological presuppositions.

While there are a number of differences between the two philosophers noted by Owens, three examples are critical differences that change the geography of their respective philosophies to an extent that one would be unable to demonstrate any meaningful symmetries in them in order to put a hyphen between the two men’s names. First, Aristotle does not differentiate between being and essence where as for Aquinas this distinction is very real and quite necessary. Secondly, Aquinas specifically points to Aristotle’s thoughts on “the sempereternity of cosmic motion and time” and that his reasoning is contingent on these beliefs. And lastly, that being can not be belong to or be the nature of any other thing, contrary to Aristotle’s efficient causality.[2]

In Aristotle’s Metaphysics, he comments that “Now although being and unity are a single nature in the sense that they are associated like principal and cause, they are not the same in the sense that they are expressed by a single concept.”[3] In response to this, Aquinas responds, “Now the terms one and being do not signify different natures but a single nature. But things can be one in two ways; for some things are one which are associated as interchangeable things, like principal and cause; and some are interchangeable not only in the sense that they are one and the same numerically [or in the subject] but also in the sense that they are one and the same conceptually, like garment and clothing.”[4] In this statement, Aquinas is taking a specifically Christian position that is critically at odds with the presuppositions of Aristotle concerning man. Aristotle sees no real reason to spend very much time concerning himself with the topic; however, this issue is critical for Aquinas in dealing with issues like the indestructibility of Human souls, animals, among other issues.[5] For Thomistic thought then, this issue is pivotal to the Christian philosophical project. In Aquinas’ Commentary on the Sentences, he explicates this “In the thing there are both the quiddity of the thing and it’s being. So in the intellect there is a double activity corresponding to those two.” Those two activities are the “understanding of divisibles” as pointed out by Aristotle, and the other activity “comprehends the thing’s being.”[6] As pointed out by Owens, “ [this is] the basis for the demonstration of a real distinction between God and creatures.”[7] A distinction that was both denied by Aristotle and unneeded in this conception of Metaphysics. The criticality of this issue had, however, been dealt with before Aquinas’ treatment of Aristotle. Gregory of Nyssa recognized the problem of being in his anti-Gnostic tract “Against Eunomius,” it becomes clear through a reading of Gregory’s work that “[the Gnostics have] changed the ethical-physical of Christianity into the purely physical…banishing the spiritual and moral he has made his [unborn] as completely single and incommunicable…”[8] It can be seen in Gregory’s tract, among other works and authors, that the problematic issues raised by an Aristotelian understanding of being go to the root of the Christian understanding of being and the soul. Thus, Aquinas not only disagrees with Aristotle, but also has basis for such a disagreement through the Church patrimony.

Aquinas was concerned with the Aristotelian tenet of the sempiternity of the universe. This doctrine is tied to other Aristotelian ideas that are contrary to the Christian philosophy as crafted by Aquinas. Aristotle contends, “There must be a principal of the kind whose substance is an actuality. Further, such substances must also be immaterial; for they must be eternal if anything else is. Hence they are actualities.”[9] In response to this, Aquinas comments, “[Aristotle] concludes in this way last because of the question which he will next raise. From this reasoning, then, it is evident that here Aristotle firmly though and believed that motion must be eternal and also time; otherwise he would not have based his plan if investigating immaterial substances on this conviction…And aside from the other arguments which he does not touch upon here, it is evident that the argument which he does give here to prove that time is eternal is not demonstrative.”[10] Aquinas also gives treatment to Aristotle’s thoughts on the sempiternity of the universe in other works. Else where in Aquinas’ commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics he also comments that “ Consequently, if the causes of motion proceed to infinity in this way, there will be no first cause. But a first cause is the cause of all things.”[11] Aquinas does not attempt to argue the point philosophically, but demands that there is a first cause regardless of the rationalization of Aristotle otherwise.

The declaration by YAHWH, ergo sum qui sum[12], provides the basis for Aquinas’ theory of being.[13] As summarized by Owens, “In philosophical language this meant that God was the first efficient cause of all other things. In this way, God was the primary instance of being. His was the nature to which all other beings had focal reference as beings.”[14] Thus all creatures have contingent being on God’s efficient causality. This combines two necessary doctrines of God, first, that God is the efficient cause of creation, and second, that man derives his being from God and not himself. This will then become important to the idea of creation ex nihilo, as God is the efficient cause of matter and form, contrary to the Aristotelian ideal. Owens sums up this difference “So conceived, this is very different from the notion of being that had been developed by Aristotle. Yet it is readily brought under the general Aristotelian concept of actuality, which was adaptable enough to under go the further extension.”[15] Aristotle fashions being as existing in man “seeing that one man and being a man and a man are the same…Moreover, the substance of each individual is…essentially a being…”[16] Since each individual, composed of eternally existing matter, is “essentially a being” God plays no significant part for Aristotle in their existence. As seen above, this becomes radically different for Aquinas who, from a distinctly Christian world view, must account for a creation by God and a God who is intimately involved in the affairs of man, problems not dealt with by Aquinas. 

To equivocate Aristotle and Aquinas seems thus to be a stretch of the imagination. While they have interesting symmetries of thought and agree on major points, for instance, on sensible objects and epistemology, it can be seen above that certain cleavages in their thinking keep them apart. Certainly to hyphenate Aristotle and Aquinas is to do the both a disservice and misrepresent their respective philosophies.

The necessity that Aquinas puts on being and essence differs from that of Aristotle. It is also critical to the understanding of the Christian concept of the soul. The sempiternally universe as opposed to ex nihilo creation demonstrates both the understanding of Aquinas of the place Christian thought on creation plays in philosophy and the critical difference between Aristotle’s thought and the Christian faith. Lastly, the Thomistic theory of being demonstrates the critical point at which the idea of creation ex nihilo and Thomistic thought on being and essence converge to demonstrate that in all three there are ideas posited by Aquinas that are contingent on one another, found in Aristotle, and contrary to Aristotelian thought. Owens summarizes this best “Yet each [Aristotle and Aquinas] of the two philosophies has to be kept carefully distinct from the other. Aristotle’s philosophy is based upon sensible natures, that of Aquinas upon sensible existents. To lump them together is to confuse their distinctive procedures and to deprive each of i

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[1] Kretzmann, Norman , and Eleonore Stump, eds. The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Pgs 38-59.

[2] Ibid., 39,40.

[3] Aquinas, St. Thomas. Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Notre Dame, Ind.: Dumb Ox Books, 1995. Pg 202.

[4] Ibid., 203.

[5] Kretzmann, Norman , and Eleonore Stump, eds. The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Pgs 39.

[6] Ibid., 58.

[7] Ibid., 39.

[8] Schaff, Phillip , and Henry Wace, eds. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers. Vol. 5. Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson Publishers, 2004. Pg 50.

[9] Aquinas, St. Thomas. Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Notre Dame, Ind.: Dumb Ox Books, 1995. Pg 791.

[10] Ibid,. 793.

[11] Ibid,. 114, 115.

[12] “I am who I am” (Ex 3:14)

[13] SCG I.22

[14]

[15]

[16]

The Sensible World of Aristotle and Plato

Tags

Aristotle, Existence, Meno, Phaedo, Philosophy, Plato, Socrates, Theory of Forms

Aristotle is not the foil of Plato, but more a natural progression of Plato’s thought. While Plato and Aristotle differ significantly in some areas, it is not possible to have Aristotle without Plato. Plato assumes the imperfection of the senses whereas Aristotle declares that if one absurd proposition is accepted then all that follows will be absurd. The relation between these two propositions may not be altogether obvious, however, they are contingent on one point. If the world is sensible then things become understandable, however, if the world is not intelligible in any meaningful way all becomes lost and indiscernible. The question then between Aristotle and Plato is how do they understand the intelligibility of the world. This tension determines all that follows. If, as Aristotle proposes, an absurd proposition is accepted (such as Parmenides axiom concerning movement) then all that follows will be affected by that presupposition. Conversely, if one were to accept Plato’s proposition that “these senses are inaccurate” the following arguments will be framed from a perspective of a faulty sensual perception. In either case the presupposition carries through into the rest of both Aristotle and Plato’s philosophy.

Plato’s Forms are couched within the context of two other arguments, first that man has preexistent knowledge, and secondly, the existence of perfect forms of individual objects which give understanding. The world then becomes understandable not because of knowledge gained in this life but through the preexistence of the knowledge resident in man’s soul. Thus, the world becomes intelligible because the man understands based on the perfection of items not through the experience of those items in the flesh. This distinction points towards Plato’s belief that true knowledge is only possible when man transcends his earthly material body. These forms for Plato existed both in ‘reality’ and ‘perfection.’ Plato gives the example of equality by asking the slave boy in Meno to retrieve two equal sticks. Socrates then asks how it is possible for this slave boy to understand the concept of perfection if he has never seen anything that is in effect perfect. Socrates then deuces that the only way for the slave boy to understand this concept is if it were already resident in his mind. It would then follow that man is born with this natural innate knowledge that is not obtained through the actual experience of ‘equality’ but through the knowing of equality prior to birth as a form. This argument is tantamount to one knowing a chair based not on the experience of a chair but through the preexistent knowledge of ‘chairness’ as a form.

Aristotle asserts, in response to Plato’s forms, that the forms are themselves not the determining factor of what a thing is but that things are copies of other things. Since for Plato there are a limited amount of forms, but that things in extant can share in forms and form ideas. This again falls into the argument that Aristotle makes since whether there is a form or an idea; things have similarity out of copy not perfection of the thing itself. This debate over the existence or nonexistence of forms is important to the discussion of sensible things since it bares the presuppositions of the philosophers. For Plato the forms represent reality while, for Plato, Aristotle’s reality represents a darker image of reality. Since Aristotle assumes the reality of the things and that they are copies, he makes Plato’s theory of preexistent knowledge less important.

For Aristotle, understanding the physical world is  essential to understand Plato’s forms. Furthermore, the interaction with the world is not based on the existence of prior knowledge, but the experience of knowledge through time. Thus, the presuppositions are laid bare concerning where in fact experience of sensible things resides, that is, whether the world is knowable or unknowable in this life. The world becomes unknowable for Plato because the world inhibits man’s understanding of reality that exists separate from the physical world. The sum of this thought is in Phaedo when Socrates says “In this, by keeping ourselves uncontaminated by the follies of the body, we shall probably reach the company of others like ourselves and gain direct knowledge of al that is pure and uncontaminated – that is presumably, of truth.” Thus for Plato (and Socrates) truth and the “follies of the body” are at odds. Experience of the material becomes, not only of lesser importance, but a block to the knowledge of the truth that is anti-flesh.

From this Plato determines that in order to reach perfection and knowledge one must separate as much as possible from the flesh and cling to the soul. The soul, understanding the forms, making life intelligible, becomes the highest good while the physical, material world becomes the barrier to truth, goodness and understanding. Aristotle determines sense as being that which allows man to communicate with the outside world, what gives man understanding of the world about him; and since man has no other means with which to understand this world it becomes imperative for him to use these capabilities in order to understand the world. Based on Aristotle’s refutation of Plato’s forms, and his understanding of why there is consistency in the nature of things, Aristotle accounts for understanding through the nature of things rather than knowledge, which is extant in the human soul. As such it becomes necessary to have a source of knowledge, which for Aristotle is the senses. Thus for Aristotle the sensible things are not something to be avoided but something to be embraced to gain knowledge. Accordingly, Aristotle’s understanding of science and specifically the reason why Aristotle places the Physics at the forefront of his examination of the sciences reflects his understanding of reality and the sensible things. For Aristotle, in order to make sense out of the world one must examine the world through the senses.

With the first book of physics at the forefront of his examination of the sciences he demonstrates the necessity of understanding a world that is both existent, changing, and within the confines of senses, perceptible. This leads Aristotle to understand senses as being the link between mans soul and the world around him. This link develops into Aristotle’s understanding of virtue, truth and the relationship between man and the world.

It is evident that Aristotle develops his system from Plato’s philosophy in order to fully develop the idea of sensible things and how we as human interact with the world around us. Even more so, however, Aristotle must deal with the moral question of Plato if the material world is an inhibitor to knowledge. For Aristotle the senses allow us to understand the world and interact with one another. Plato produces a system where the world becomes counterproductive to the acquisition of knowledge. Aristotle declares this to be counterintuitive since the senses provide the only source of information about the world and thus the source for real knowledge. Furthermore, for Aristotle it is through the world and the interaction with it that man is able to develop virtue and understanding. Thus for Plato, sensible things inhibit the ability to understand while for Aristotle sensible things are the source of understanding.

 

Humanism…

Tags

Humanism, Immanuel Kant, Integral Humanism, Jacques Maritain, Kant, Maritain, Marxist Humanism, Thomas Aquinas

Humanism has paraded itself in many costumes through history. Humanism under the Renaissance perceived of man as the master of the material, that man is to control and have dominion over the earth. At first, this perception was cast within a distinctly Christian context, but soon thereafter was ground down into Humanism without dignity. This destruction was contingent on the presupposition of the Modern Humanism itself that is a distinctly anthropocentric perspective on the world and the metaphysic. This anthropocentrism was to cause a myriad of problems, not just theoretically, but practically. Jacques Maritain, taking umbrage of the issues that had faced modern philosophy, and the serious outcomes in the life of man caused by these faulty presuppositions, wrote Integral Humanism to address these issues with a reformed perspective on man and the world. In his foreword to the 1968 edition of Integral Humanism, Jacques Maritain declares that “[t]he questions dealt with here belong to that part of philosophy which Aristotle and St. Thomas call “practical philosophy,” because it envelops in a general way the whole philosophy of human action…”[1]

It is this concept of “practical philosophy” that is the basis of Mairtain’s Integral Humanism both as a work and as a philosophical project. There is nothing revolutionary in the concepts put forward by Maritain insomuch as others both within and without the church have declared such things before. Concepts and ideas in Integral Humanism can be found in Augustine of Hippo, Thomas Aquinas, John Calvin, Plato, Cotton Mather and others. What sets Maritain’s work apart, and specifically here what makes his work of great import for the modern question of Humanism is his distillation of the issues facing secular Humanism and the destructive nature of the secular project. In a coda for his book, Maritain declares, “love is a savage force.”[2] Humanism and Marxist Humanism specifically, aim to love humanity and to save humanity from the destruction of itself. But it is the love, as understood by the secular humanists, that is so destructive and suffers from diminishing returns due to its anthropocentric core presupposition and in the end leads to the destruction of man and his dignity.

The Integral Humanism as presented by Maritain assumes God as the measure whereas the Secular Humanists assume man as the measure. It is this difference that Maritain is attempting to reconcile and to present a functioning methodology that would not lead man to a destructive end. Integral Humanism presents a Humanism “…capable of saving and of promoting, in a synthesis fundamentally different, all the truths affirmed or glimpsed by socialist humanism, by uniting them in an organic and vital manner with numerous other truths.”[3] It is the integration of both the positive aspects of Humanism with traditional Thomism and Aristotle that Maritain puts forward a new and reformed Humanism for the transformation of society.

Humanism for Maritain is inseparable from civilization, they are, in fact, the same thing for Maritain. Civilization is one of the core aspects of the Human on earth as understood by Maritain both to the glory of God and the betterment of the Human condition. It is through the “creative forces and the life of reason”[4] that man leverages in pursuit of the betterment of himself and his fellow man. Humanism, for Maritian , represents the ability for man to “manifest his original greatness”[5] to achieve the betterment of civilization and fellow man. Essentially, Maritain sees man for man in the context of God. Maritain is able to hold this perspective because he rejects the Protestant view of man as depraved. Within a Thomistic conception of man, Maritain is able to see man as the civilization builder and creator of a better, if not redeemed, world. Maritain views this new conception of man as the helpmate of God in the building civilization as “humanism [making] man grow in communion…”[6]

Humanism as a term is not extremely useful insofar as precision is concerned. It has been used a number of ways to describe a number of disparate thoughts and concepts. Broadly, humanism conceives of the human as maintaining a special position within the scheme of things and has been articulated differently in different historical periods.[7] Machiavelli stands as one of the first modern humanist thinkers within the broad concept of modern humanism. Machiavelli conceived of humanism and the virtue of man “creating and appropriating his own world on earth.”[8] Machiavelli took a decidedly anti-Christian approach to humanism defining the approach of Christians to dealing with issues in the world as weak.[9] Machiavelli’s concept of the ends justifying the means was dealt with by Maritain and was treated by him as one of the most pernicious doctrines of Machiavelli’s brand of secular humanism.[10]

However, it is in Kant that the modern argument of the value of humanity finds its voice. Kant’s approach to the value of humanity has been summarized in modern society as “lets agree to disagree.” Kant, later on, had a profound impact on both the philosophy of Hegel and Marx. Maritain deals specifically with Marx due to the context in which Maritain was writing at the time. However, the concepts are need not be contextualized as Maritain’s problems with Marx can also be found in Kant and Hegel. Kant attempted in Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals to explain why humans have inherent rights and to develop a higher order system for understanding the place of man in the world, specifically, a world without an intelligible God. The central issue that Kant deals with is the value of humans, and in a world without a deity how does one ascribe value to a human? The answer that Kant finds to this question is in their rational faculty, and thus Kant distinguishes between a squirrel or peacock as mere things and maintaining only a relative value because they lack rational faculties and can be used as means (or more frankly, I can eat them—they have no rights).§ But it is in the rational faculty of man that Kant finds his value “[r]ational beings, on the other hand, are called persons because their nature already marks them out as ends in themselves—that is, as something which ought not to be used merely as a means—and consequently imposes restrictions on all decision making…”[11] As is demonstrated here in this passage, Kant finds value in man not from value ascribed from above, but from within the mind and not the heart. It is the rational faculties of man that make man valuable regardless of any other faculties that may make him unique in the ordered world. Moral action then for Kant is in the mutual support of an individuals ends as the person is an end in and of himself or herself within the rationalistic framework of Kant. Thus, according to Kant “…as regards meritorious duties to others, the natural end that all human beings seek is their own perfect happiness.”[12] And thus “For the ends of any person who is an end in himself, if this idea is to have full effect in me, must be also, as far as possible, my ends.”[13] At its core, Kant’s argument is that the only reason I can love other people is because I first love myself, and at its core the only reason I support other people is that I love myself. It is then only is self seeking and self fulfillment that man, within a Kantian sense, can love his fellow man, and only because he is rational, as within Kant’s system the Imago Dei is obliterated.      Maritain takes up the statement of Marx that “It is easy to be a saint when one has no wish to be human.”[14] Maritain responds to Marx by demonstrating that the Marxist conception of love for fellow humans is flawed at its core. Marx based this love largely on the concept of Kant’s interest in the ends of others as well as my own singularly because they are ends in and of themselves. But it is the Atheism, according to Maritain, that makes “certain fibers”[15] of a man’s heart hard and impenetrable. In a world so conceived, Maritain foresees a world of stones hitting stones with no penetrable hearts of man.

Both in Kant and Machiavelli is found the concept of man over matter, that his rational faculties has appointed him in a position of domination over all matter in the created order. In Maritain’s analysis of this modern humanist view and conception of man “God dies; materialized man thinks he can be man or superman only if God is not God.”[16] It is due to this need, according to Maritain, that man creates a God who becomes guarantor of his domination over mater. It is within the “humanistic dialectic, God becomes guarantor of the domination of man over matter. This is the Cartesian God…Yet the infinite is declared to be absolutely inscrutable; we are blind to it; and so a germ of agnosticism is already present in Cartesian rationalism.”[17] This humanistic dialectic that God is both knowable in his existence but yet inscrutable that Maritain sees the seed of agnosticism that from Descartes would come to full bloom in Kant. As demonstrated prior, Kant believed all things that did not posses rational capacity were means, and thus under what Maritain called materialized man.

Integral humanism is a project whereby truths of socialist humanism and numerous other truths (implicitly not posited by socialist humanism) are to be integrated into a coherent whole. The inherent difference between the two, however, is that socialist humanism – and by lineage Descartes, Kant and Machiavelli – attempts to start at a fixed knowable point on which all other points and beliefs will or can be based. Maritain introduces a humanism based on transcendent truths concerning God and the world that exist in spite of man not for or by him.

Maritain believes that developing an integral humanism “demands, on the one hand, that one respect the essential exigencies of human nature, and that image of God, and that primacy of transcendent values…”.[18] While Maritain is recognizing, as does Kant, that the rational faculties (the exigencies of human nature) do have value, they are not understandable apart from the Imago Dei nor transcendent (and universal) values. This is in opposition to both Descartes and Kant who believed that the rational faculties were the substance that gave man value over material. For Maritain, this creates a power structure that is not based on Christian principals as man has no ownership over God’s creation. So, whereas Kant, Descartes and Machiavelli would have man over earth, Maritain would, in terms of a movement toward integral humanism, posit a world “of God first and of man with Him.”[19]

Maritain posits a worldview where man integrates both truths accessible to him by reason and those that are transcendent, knowable only through a transcendent God. It is the integration of these two concepts that brings about a humanism that Maritain believes is transformative in the lives of men. It is in the use of civilization, culture and the created order that man can begin to develop a just society for all people. Maritain’s integral humanism “does not worship man but really and effectively respects human dignity and does justice to the integral demands of the person, as oriented toward a socio-temporal realization of the Gospel’s concern for human things and toward the idea of a fraternal community.”[20] Civilization for Maritain, and the contingent humanism within that civilization, exists for the benefit of God through the betterment of man.

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[1] Jacques Maritain, The Collected Works of Jacques Maritain (Notre Dame, 1996), vol. 11, 150.

[2] Ibid, 209.

[3] Ibid, 208.

[4] Ibid, 166.

[5] Ibid, 155.

[6] Ibid, 155.

[7] Konstantine Kolenda, The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Robert Audi (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 396.

[8] Joseph Femia, “Machiavelli and Italian Fascism,” History of Political Thought 25, no. 1(2004): 7

[9]  Ibid, 12.

[10] James V. Schall, Jacques Maritain: The Philosopher in Society, (Lanham, MA: Rowman & Littlefield), 8.

• § Pope John Paul II writes in Veritas Splendor, “Certain ethical theories, called “teleological“, claim to be concerned for the conformity of human acts with the ends pursued by the agent and with the values intended by him. The criteria for evaluating the moral rightness of an action are drawn from the weighing of the non-moral or pre-moral goods to be gained and the corresponding non-moral or pre-moral values to be respected.”  http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_06081993_veritatis-splendor_en.html

[11] Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Arnulf Zweig, ed. Thomas E. Hill, Jr. and Arnulf Zweig. (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 4:428.

[12] Ibid, 4:429.

[13] Ibid, 4:429.

[14] Jacques Maritain, The Collected Works of Jacques Maritain (Notre Dame, 1996), vol. 11, 202.

[15] Ibid, 202.

[16] Ibid, 172.

[17] Ibid, 173.

[18] Ibid, 211.

[19] Ibid, 211.

[20] Ibid, 257.

Rationality

Tags

Aquinas, Aristotle, Christianity, God, Irrationality, Thomas, Thomas Aquinas, Thomism

Irrational is defined as “not endowed with reason or understanding”[1]; or alternatively, rationality is defined as “conformity to reason and such elements as intelligibility, consistency, coherency, order, logical structure, completeness, testability, and simplicity.”[2] What makes something rational is its relationship to the known and experienced world. When something falls outside of this experience it leans towards irrational. Aristotle suggests that the soul has rational and irrational attributes and that the rational only produces rational outcomes and the irrational only produces irrational outcomes. Thomas, when commenting on this section of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, notes that this is comparable to heat only being cable of heating and what is cool only being capable of cooling.[3] For Aquinas, if something is irrational it can only, logically produce that which is irrational and like wise, he would agree with Aristotle, that only a rational thing can produce rational results. Therefore, based on Aristotle’s own observations on irrationality, to introduce irrationality into the articles of the Christian faith would be to create a theological structure which could only produce irrational results and would ultimately make any who ascribe to such a faith irrational in themselves.[4]

But why is irrationality in and of itself bad? Aquinas writes: “In connection with human acts the words good and bad are applied on the basis of comparison to reason, because…a human being’s good is existing in accordance with reason, while what is bad for a human being is what ever is contrary to reason. For what is good for any thing is what goes together with it in keeping with its form, and what is bad for it is whatever is contrary to the order associated with its form.[5]” Reason defines that which is good and reasons opposite would be bad. Thus, Aquinas’ thoughts become more clear on the topic demonstrating that not only does irrationality introduce unwanted philosophical problems into the Christian faith, but it itself is bad. If irrationality is fundamentally evil or bad then any irrational element in the Christian faith, by using Aristotle’s functions of rational and irrationality, would infect all of the Christian faith with an evil that is insurmountable.

A fully developed example of this line of thinking can be found in Veritas Splendor, Where Pope John Paul II declares that rationality is what separates man from beast, that rationality allows man to contemplate theoretical intellect and that if irrationality were introduced into the Christian faith it would call into question the truth of such faith. Veritas Splendor is an example of applied Thomism in its definition of the interaction of faith a reason. Versitas Splendor seeks to expound on what Anslem called “faith seeking understanding.” The importance of Veritas Splendor is not that it has anything novel or new to say, but in opposition to new, it defends the basis of Thomism that irrationality cannot be found in the articles of faith and if it were that it would ultimately destroy that faith. In Pope John Paul’s writing then one can see the reflection of where Aquinas was headed, that in a rational world created by an intelligent creator, irrationality has no place in our understanding of that world or its creator and maintainer.[6]

In examining Aquinas’ metaphysics, Wipple puts it this way: “To admit that faith and reason could really be in contradiction with one another would be to acknowledge that in such a case one or the other was false. For Aquinas this would ultimately make God himself the author of falsity, which he [Aquinas] rejects as impossible.”[7] Wipple’s summation of Aquinas’ thought points one back to Aristotle’s Metaphysics “[W]e take it for impossible for a thing to be and not be at the same time…[8]” As applied to Wipple’s understanding of Aquinas, if faith and reason are opposites, to have one would imply the lack or negation of the other. Otherwise stated, if reason or faith contains an aspect of irrationality, it would necessitate that they could not be in conformity with one another since A cannot be non-A simultaneously.  Aquinas, commenting on the law of noncontradiction as defined here by Aristotle puts it this way:  “[I]t is impossible for the same attribute both to belong and not belong to the same subject at the same time…It is impossible, then, for anyone to be mistaken in his own mind about these things and to think that the same thing both is and is not at the same time.”[9] The law of noncontradiction, as set forth by Aristotle, plays a part of the utmost importance in Aquinas’ understanding of faith and reason. As afore stated, if any irrationality exists within a given subject it will infect the whole, and furthermore, given such a subject, under the law of noncontradiction it could not be compatible with something that is rational. Additionally, since only that which is true is rational, and since an aspect of irrationality infects the whole as irrational, it is concluded by Aquinas “ …it is impossible for the truth of faith to be contrary to principals known by natural reason.”[10] It has been best summed up “Thomas holds that it is impossible for those things revealed to us by God through faith to be opposed to those we can discover by using natural reason. For then one or the other would have to be false; and since both come to us from God, God himself would be the author of falsity, something Thomas rejects as abhorrent.”[11]

Thus it can be concluded that Aquinas fears irrationality because 1^st, irrationality is evil. Since a God who is coherent is understood as creating the world, incoherency would logically be opposed to such a God and therefore, being at odds with such a God, be evil. 2^nd, Irrationality has an all-infecting property, whereby if irrationality is assumed within the structure of a belief or idea it in turn makes the entirety of the belief irrational due to that logical function of irrationality.a 3^rd, if an aspect of faith were to be demonstrably shown to be irrational, it would be, under the law of non-contradiction, opposed to reason; therefore, if an aspect of faith is irrational then all of faith is irrational, faith is evil as it is in opposition to the understanding of a coherent God, and lastly it is opposed in all ways to rationality under the law of noncontradiction. In summary, for Aquinas, a faith that is irrational says nothing about God, says nothing that is true, and is in its entirety evil and opposed to what is moral, factual, and beautiful.

What then does this say about Aquinas in regards to his temper and the character of his philosophy? First, Aquinas’ concept of the noetic effects of sin[12] are tempered by his conviction that the rational aspect of man is not fallen as opposed to the physical aspect of man which is fully under the force of the fall.[13] For Aquinas, the intellect, not suffering from the fall, has an ability to understand, through reason, the existence and requirements of God. Second, the world of Aquinas is intelligible and understandable both materially and metaphysically. Man’s senses understand the world and what it is truthfully. In Aquinas’ world, man reasons and perceives truth rightly when he rigorously applies logic to his experience of the created order. Thirdly, Aquinas sees all of philosophy as a servant for a coherent and logical faith. In Aquinas, faith seeking understanding is philosophy as the handmaiden or servant of Theology the king of the sciences. The created order must be coherent as it was created by a coherent logical God. Since the created order must reflect something about the creator, it would stand that God must be orderly and logical. The only way to get from man’s understanding of the world and his capabilities to an understanding of God himself requires that man have a logical function that unaided can understand the creator of the created order of which man has sensible data.  Furthermore, since God and the created order are logical, rational and coherent, man must have the ability to understand given his logical and rational capabilities. These capabilities reflecting God, should point man inevitably toward God.  In all these things God, holding them together points to himself and creates both a material and immaterial world that have coherent laws of logic and rationality. The temper then of Aquinas is logical. In a Thomistic world, nothing can be illogical if it points to God the creator of the world. Everything that is illogical is ultimately against God.

As opposed to modern philosophers since Descartes, Aquinas demands that something can be known apart from man himself and that the world is intelligible. Furthermore, Aquinas would argue that sense data is reliable, that man should start in his understanding of the world outside of himself, and that logic can lead man to make universal truth claims about the world. This would make Aquinas an empiricist only in so much as Aquinas believed that the starting point was without not within and that what was without was reliable; however, Aquinas would not be an empiricist in the modern sense given his thoughts on metaphysics.[14]

Aquinas then, is a logical empiricist who excepts the tenants of metaphysics and believes that they can be understood as a coherent whole based on man’s a posteriori knowledge, experiences and sense datum. The whole created order; both physical and spiritual is held together by the nature of God and who He is and the reflections of God in the created order. God then binds himself by His own laws, and those laws can be known by man, who then, having a right understanding of logic and experience, can move through metaphysics to a right understanding of God.

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[1] rational. (2009). In Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. Retrieved December 11, 2009, from http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/irrational

[2] McKim, Donald K. Westminster Dictionary of Theological Terms. Louisville , Ky.: Westminster John Knox Press, 1996.

[3] Aquinas, Thomas . Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Notre Dame, Ind.: Dumb Ox Books, 1995.

[4] Aquinas, Thomas . Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Notre Dame, Ind.: Dumb Ox Books, 1995.

[5] Craig, Edward, ed. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Vol. 7. New York: Routledge, 1998. pg 340

[6] Veritas Splendor. 1993. http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_06081993_veritatis-splendor_en.html (11 December 2009).

[7] Kretzmann, Norman, and Eleonore Stump, eds. The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Pg 83.

[8] Aquinas, Thomas . Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Notre Dame, Ind.: Dumb Ox Books, 1995. Pg 220.

[9] Ibid 222

[10] http://www2.nd.edu/Departments/Maritain/etext/gc1_7.htm

[11] Audi, Robert, ed. The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Pg 39.

a As a sub-point to this argument, it becomes apparent that even irrationality has a rational aspect in its behaviors and effects where it comes in contact with others. What is unclear to the author is whether that rational aspect of the behaviors or irrationality comes from the interaction with the rational or is of itself a function of irrationality.

[12] Plantinga, Alvin. Warranted Christian Belief. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pg 213.

[13] Berkhof, Hendrikus. Christian Faith. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1979. Pg 179.

[14] Coppelston, Frederick; “A History of Philosophy: British Philosophy” Continuum Press New York 2003. Pg 78.

Philosophy of Nature

Tags

Bertrand Russell, David Hume, Epicurus, Existence of God, God, Hume, Quantum Mechanics, Russell

There has long been a belief that man by his experience and rational faculties, can fully account for and explain the world around him, interpret phenomena and arrive at truth. Faith in the rational faculties of man spans time from the Epicureans, Hume, Descartes, Kant and modern philosophers of science. This perspective can best be summed up in Bertrand Russell’s speech Why I am Not a Christian “Science can teach us, and I think our own hearts can teach us, no longer to look around for imaginary supports, no longer to invent allies in the sky, but rather to look to our own efforts here below…conquer the world by intelligence.”[1] In the years following Russell’s speech, advances in Quantum Mechanics and sub-atomic particle theory led to new questions concerning the nature of reality and how it can be interpreted based on new discoveries. This led scientists such as Einstein, Mach and Heisenberg, to propose alternate explanations accounting for phenomena based on these new discoveries. What becomes clear after a review of the works of Russell, Hume, Kant and others, is the inability of the scientific method to provide a basis for a coherent philosophy or adequately inform a broader metaphysical philosophy. The scientific method, and the rules for the scientific method as first outlined by Newton, cannot account for recent discoveries in physics. These discoveries demonstrate that the anthropocentric perspective of the scientific method, while capable of providing reliable information about immediate phenomena, cannot provide information to inform a broader understanding of the universe or negate coherent metaphysical philosophy.

The scientific method is based on a few critical presuppositions informing the way it understands phenomena and ultimately the world around us. Those who use the scientific method accept these presuppositions in order to “make it work.” However, the application of the scientific method to all areas of life creates problems for the scientist as he goes from the macro-world we have immediate interaction with to the micro-world we have mediated interaction with through either advanced tools or theories. As some scientists have approached this micro level through various disciplines, such as quantum mechanics, they have discovered areas of the physical world that do not abide by the laws of mathematics and logic that apply to the macro world. These discoveries have thrown how scientists understand causality, contingency and the scientific method itself into disarray. The critical assumption of the scientific method is the assumption man can adequately understand the world around him through his senses alone and subject those sensations to a rigorous rationality to discover real truth.X What some scientists and philosophers have discovered since Descartes and Hume is a world where man’s interaction with nature is not a sufficient measure and some other measure must be implemented. Many scientists have different ideas about what can replace the foundationalist approach to understanding the world. What is clear, however, unqualified rationalism does not present a coherent worldview when more recent understandings of physics and a formal examination of the presuppositions are scrutinized. Many of the arguments against the existence of God and metaphysics in general have been based on rationality; this rationality, within the scientific method, is then applied to metaphysics resulting in the demand that metaphysics be demonstrated by this method. If rationality and experience are a poor basis for metaphysics, and if the rationality presupposed in the scientific method is unable to describe the behavior of the physical world coherently, then the scientific method cannot say anything meaningful beyond a very bracketed set of phenomena.

Epicurus was one of the earliest philosophers to develop a philosophy based on sensory experience. Epicurus believed that only those things learned through sense experience had meaning. Furthermore, he  argued that sense experience was the only means to understand nature and denied any appeal to an external criterion of knowledge apart from that which can be  learned through sense experience. Epicurus’ developed a full philosophy of nature based on his unassailable view of human experience.  Epicurus’ views demonstrate an early philosophical school dedicated to the singular validity of human experience for knowledge of the world over philosophy or theology.[2]

When David Hume wrote, “The most lively thought is still inferior to the dullest sensation” he was arguing that mans understanding of relation and causality is based on experience and does not accurately reflect reality. When examining phenomena from Hume’s perspective, the only thing intelligible man can say about what is being observed is his perceptions. Hume writes “All the operations [perception of causality and relation] are a species of natural instincts which no reasoning or process of the thought and understanding is either able to produce or prevent.” For Hume, man cannot say anything intelligible about the thing itself, the perceptions of reality are locked up in mans mind and cannot truly pursue truth apart form the truth of the perceptions; that is, are these perceptions truly perceptions or somehow mistaken? In sum, Hume writes “No object ever discovers, by the qualities which appear to the senses, either the causes which produced it or the effects which will arise from it; nor can our reason, unassisted by experience, ever draw any inference concerning real existence or matter of fact.” What then is found in Hume is an extreme experiential understanding of the world, where human sensations can only say anything intelligible about experience, not the thing itself. Hume is incapable of accounting for consistency in the laws of mathematics, logic or the created order since these must be assumed by Hume a priori as it is not possible, under Hume’s rubric, to experience all of logic or mathematics, it must be assumed. Hume then has the expectation that this consistency is to be accepted by a matter of fact under the general experience of man with out explaining why.[3]

Descartes Cogito Ergo Sum is the basis for all knowledge within his philosophical system. This starting point for observation and understanding of the world, is based on the assumption man’s thinking will provide the best ground to understand the world as it is. This hypothesis springs from the presupposition that man is the basis for determining the world and the way it operates. Such an anthropocentric starting point, like Hume, assumes man can rightly interpret sensation and that those sensations can be quantified into a broader understanding of the world that will fit into this calculus scheme. Under such an understanding, all sensation, based on the perception of man, thus quantified and broadly understood through this calculus will provide data that rightly defines what is true and false. The underlying assumption for both Descartes and Hume is that the human mind operates properly and is capable of understanding and deriving truth from experience that is unassailable by information derived through thought apart from sensation.[4]

Umberto Eco, writing on Immanuel Kant, points out that Kant presents problems for empiricists such as Descartes and Hume. Kant postulates that experience and intellect are essential to understanding phenomena. This intellect allows man to understand what is experienced and is not a posteriori but a priori it is in fact who man is that he has intellect. Kant however, cannot account for the intellect, as it exists, since the intellect understands causality a priori. Causality and relationship are understood by Kant to exist apart from the mind but without explanation. While Kant can provide a linkage between intellect and experience, he cannot account for the understanding of relationship and causality apart from inward intellect that assumes the man as the sensory object. Kant cannot account for why there is causality, relationship and consistency, he can only account for intellect as a core component of understanding  sensory data.[5]

The modern philosophy of science has a wide variety of perspectives regarding the Scientific Method; however, there are some presuppositions within science that find common currents through these varied philosophical strains. Generally, these can be found in Newton’s four Rules of Reasoning in Philosophy. These rules are: First, We are to admit no more causes of natural things than such as are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances. Second, Therefore to the same natural effects we must, as far as possible, assign the same causes. Third, the qualities of bodies, which admit neither intensification nor remission of degrees, and which are found to belong to all bodies within the reach of our experiments, are to be esteemed the universal qualities of all bodies whatsoever. Fourth, In experimental philosophy we are to look upon propositions inferred by general induction from phenomena as accurately or very nearly true, not withstanding any contrary hypothesis that may be imagined, till such time as other phenomena occur, by which they may either be made more accurate, or liable to exceptions.[6]

What is critical to understand about these assumptions is the utter reliance on the reliability of human experience. The reliance goes so far to assume the third rule seeking to apply what we know about the macro world to the micro world. Ernan McMullin, writing on Newton’s third law, casts it a “pious hope.” But, such a “pious hope” should not have been surprising given the “no more causes” first rule of Newton. As the only causes Newton would admit are “inferred by general induction from phenomena” it would follow Newton would also assume “the universal qualities.” McMullin’s “pious hope” comes from the discoveries in quantum physics by Niles Bohr.[7] “Bohr argues that the world is much more complex than classical physics supposed…” Bohr’s discoveries on the complexity of matter at the quantum level disproved Newton’s third law. Bohr’s discovery demonstrates that human experience alone is incapable of rationally explaining phenomena.

This discovery creates a problem for the modern philosopher and scientist. If experience is not the foundation that Newton assumed, what are the alternatives? Alex Rosenberg takes up this very question in his essay “Biology and its Philosophy.” Rosenberg grapples with the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principal, which maintains that if a particle is to be measured, the acting of measurement creates uncertainty in the measurement itself. With regard to the Heisenberg Principal, Rosenberg writes “responsible physicists have held that recent experiments require either the surrender of quantum mechanics or the ‘metaphysical’ thesis that there is a world of enduring physical objects that exist independent of our knowledge of them. If these two proposals are coherent, then the experimental evidence that tests quantum mechanics can lead us to surrender, for factual reasons, principals of logic and mathematics we supposed to be necessarily true, and metaphysical theses Positivists are supposed to be without empirical significance.”[8] This loaded charge is based on the refutation of Newton’s third law as previously stated. This refutation, or rather, the strain between Newtonian physics and the empirical foundationalism that under girds them; vis a vis the relatively recent discoveries of Quantum Mechanics, presents a critical question to be answered. Namely, are human perceptions archetypal or ectypal? The scientific method can only have merit if the phenomena being examined are real. If what is experienced in an observation is, as Hume argues, not reflective of anything but the workings of the human mind, than science can truly be said to have nothing meaningful to say about the created order. Conversely, if as Rosenberg argues quantum mechanics is accepted as true, science must then reexamine the presupposition that experience is the only valid basis for truth.

Physics represents the purest example of understanding nature and represents the most fundamental questions for philosophy as can be seen with regard to questions of experience in Newton and Quantum Physics and Mechanics. Roy Clouser examines this in further detail in his book “The Myth of Religious Neutrality.” In Clouser’s examination of three different perspectives concerning reality and causality, his determination is that the foundational rationalism used by scientists is ill-founded and has no more warrant than religious belief as it requires some similar assumptions. Clouser examines three scientists’ (Mach, Einstein, and Heisenberg) views of reality in order to demonstrate the “perspectival hypothesis” (Clouser’s wording for presupposition) that leads them to an understanding of reality. Ernst Mach came to the conclusion that all we could know “from experience, reality is made of sensations.” This led Mach to argue, inline with Hume, nothing was truly real, ideas like atoms and particles were not representative of the real world but only provided a meaningful representation of what existed. For Mach nothing could be truly known or understood. Einstein, however, would argue that these things could be understood as true as it “lends so much rational understanding to our sense perceptions that we are entitled to believe it is true.” Einstein’s word choice is interesting in the application of the word “believe” as Clouser demonstrates, it later shows up in other writings pointing toward a faith in the perceptions rather than a Newtonian truth. Clouser goes on to examine Werner Heisenberg and his hypothesis that “observable objects…are essentially mathematical possibilities.” Additionally, Heisenberg was an adherent of the “Copenhagen Interpretation”—that things are inherently changed by observation and measurement. Heisenberg went as far to say that particles do not have both speed and location but only that which is measured. What Clouser demonstrates is that the more Quantum Mechanics is analyzed the more uncertainty about Newton Rules of Reasoning develops.[9] This uncertainty is linked to the inability to explain what is happening from  an anthropomorphic perspective.  Fundamentally, those researching Quantum Mechanics must revisit the assumptions of Newton, as they do not provide singularly reliable and meaningful guide to understand what exactly is being observed even within the “Copenhagen Interpretation.”

Charles Taylor examines the modern scientific perspective and notes that “An account in terms of impersonal causal law seemed called for by the new depth sense of reality in the universe. This inference was all the stronger in that the sense of the disengaged reason, construing the world as it does as devoid of human meaning, fits better with the impersonal picture. But this stance is part of the modern identity of the buffeted self, which thus finds affinity for the impersonal order.” Taylor is pointing out that it is natural when the views of any of the three scientists are taken to their full measure ( as Rosenberg argues) one must give up consistency or one must give up “Positivist metaphysics.” Taylor believes that, not giving up the “Positivist Metaphysics” leads one to look for a perspective apart from human experience.[10] This perspective is obviously non-existent, though some Digital Physicists have attempted to argue otherwise. Much of human meaning is bound up in the concept of causality. Clouser, from a Theistic perspective, argues that God is not the initial cause (or the uncaused cause) but the creator of causality itself. Assuming Clouser is correct, even if man could attain what Taylor calls “the view form nowhere,” causality could never prove or disprove the existence of God. Causality would have to become something that was accepted prima facie.

What both modern philosophy of science and historic philosophy of epistemology demonstrates is its incapacity to explain phenomena apart from an inadequate perception of man. Modern philosophers of science understood man had limitations preventing him from saying anything quantifiably true and meaningful based on sense perception. Philosophers who have dealt with epistemology have, alternatively, attempted to derive a methodology to know that sense perception provided reliable data; however this project has provided more difficulties than answers to real questions about phenomena apart from sense perception and intellect as being core functions of the physical world. The implications for the scientific method are far reaching. If, in the final analysis, the scientific method and the Newtonian rules are incapable of expressing truth, man must either reject the modern notion of science that sensation can provide reliable data that reflects the world, or it must provide a new understanding for existence. The presuppositions of the scientific method are that perceptions of the physical world provide the most reliable data available to the individual on which to base fact. If however, these sensations do not provide a coherent understanding of the universal through a unified theory, there is no method by which science can provide meaningful information beyond what is merely probable.[11]

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[1] Russell, Bertrand. Why I am not a Christian. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957. pg 22

X As the aim of this paper is to examine the presuppositions of the scientific method, and the problems that these presuppositions engender, an alternative will not be presented. However, the underlying thesis for an alternative would be based on the noetic effects of sin on man’s rational capacity.

[2] Morgan, Michael L. Classics of Moral and Political Theory. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2005. pg 419

[3] Ariew, Roger, and Eric Watkins. Modern Philosophy. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1998. Pg. 486

[4] Ibid., 22

[5] Eco, Umberto. Kant and the Platypus. New York: Harcourt Inc, 1999. Pg. 76

[6] Matthews, Michael R. The Scientific Background to Modern Philosophy. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1998. Pg 146

[7] McMullin, Ernan. “A Case for Scientific Realism.” In Philosophy of Science, Yuri Balashov and Alex Rosenberg, 248-281. New York: Routledge, 2002.

[8] Rosenberg, Alex. “Biology and its Philosophy.” In Philosophy of Science, Yuri Balashov and Alex Rosenberg, 22-36. New York: Routledge, 2002.

[9] Clouser, Roy A. The Myth of Religious Neutrality. South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991. Pgs 128-140

[10] Taylor, Charles. A Secular Age. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007., pg 363

[11] Wallace, William A. The Modeling of Nature. Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996., pg 248.

“I am well awar…

“I am well aware, almighty God and Father, that in my life I owe you a most particular duty. It is to make my every thought and word speak of you.”

Hilary of Poitiers, Hammer of the Arians, 300 AD to 368 AD.

St. Augustine of Hippo’s use of Romans 10:17 in the Anti-Pelagian writings

Tags

Augustine, Augustine of Hippo, Christ, Grace, Jerome, Paul, Pelagianism, Pelagius

The anti-Pelagian writings of Augustine are examples of his most explicit statements concerning soteriology. Within these writings, Augustine expresses his understanding of soteriology as a foil to the heterodox doctrines of Pelagius. Augustine defines Pelagianism as denying original sin; that the grace of God is given by the man’s merits; and, that forgiveness of sins is not necessary for the righteous man.[1] Augustine understands the movement of the reprobate man to redeemed man as initiated by an effectual external calling by God. This external calling of the Gospel may lead to an effectual internal calling, or response, within the individual.[2] Augustine comprehends hearing, an external call to repentance and faith in Christ, as being imperative for effectual calling unto repentance. Romans 10:17 provides the most perspicuous theology regarding the source of faith, Paul writes, “So faith comes from what is heard, and what is heard comes through the word of Christ.” (Rom 10:17 NRSV)

Although Romans 10:17 is one of the most unambiguous statements on the source of faith it only appears twice in Augustine’s anti-Pelagian writings. The concept of hearing the gospel as the initial requirement for an effectual calling unto repentance, and ultimately salvation, is found throughout Augustine’s writings. Augustine understood the criticality of hearing the gospel, and speech itself, as a means of grace. His training and employment in rhetoric prepared him for the pulpit and prophetic speech.[3] It should come as no surprise then–Augustine held the hearing of the gospel in high regard. However, Augustine does not work out his theology of hearing as a means of grace philosophically or rhetorically, but theologically. He approaches Romans 10:17 as a doctrinal statement of fact that does not require further interpretation or exegesis, for Augustine, Paul’s point is clear.

Exposition on Romans 10:14-17

            Romans 10:14-17 concerns how Gentiles, who both have and have not heard the Gospel are held accountable for repentance. Paul begins by asking the rhetorical question “But how are they to call on one in whom they have not believed? And how are they to believe in one whom they have not heard?” (Romans 10:14a NRSV) Paul here is providing a rhetorical device with regard to the question of the eternal state of those who have not received the gospel; or those who hearing, rejected the news of the gospel. Paul in verse 16 looks back to Isaiah 53:1 “But not all have obeyed the good news; for Isaiah says ‘Lord, who has believed our message?’” Paul then answers the rhetorical questions with Romans 10:17. Some have assessed Romans 10:17 as out of place in the text, some scholars going as far a questioning the authenticity of the verse itself. Douglas Moo, in his commentary on Romans writes “[Romans 10:17] picks up immediately the connection between ‘believing’ and ‘hearing/report’ that the quotation of Isa. 53:1 in v. 16b assumes and restates the second step in the series of salvation requirements: faith comes as a result of ‘hearing’ (cf. v. 14b).”[4]

Romans 10 has a special doctrinal scope within the larger general doctrinal scope of Romans. Paul presents a logical argument within Romans 10 to support his special scope of the place of hearing the gospel and salvation. Romans 10:17 is Paul’s quod erat demonstrandum of this special scope, with the final conclusion that unless one has heard the gospel, one cannot have saving faith in the substitutionary atonement of Christ.[5] John Calvin, in his commentary on Romans notes, “This is a remarkable passage with regard to the efficacy of preaching; for he testifies, that by it faith is produced.”[6] Aquinas, also writes commenting on Romans 10:17, “The answer is that two things are required for faith: one is the inclining of the heart to believe; and this does not come from hearing, but from the gift of grace; the other is a decision about what to believe and comes from hearing.”[7] It follows then that hearing is the efficient cause of faith that follows a predisposition towards faith in the heart. Early church fathers (Clement of Alexandria; Tertullian; and Chrysostom) were generally unanimous in their collective exegesis of the verse. John of Damascus writes “For by hearing the divine scriptures we believe in the teaching of the Holy Sprint.” [8]

Augustine, capitalizing on the verse, uses the necessity of hearing the kerygma as a means of grace unto faith (unto salvation) to demonstrate the heterodoxy of the Pelagian position. If faith in Christ is conditional for salvation; and, if only those who have heard can have faith; then it follows that only those who have heard the gospel can be saved. Such an argument presents a problem for the Pelagian, as the call of the gospel is not imperative but indicative, an historical account that something had been accomplished.  The Gospel is written as a statement of fact—Christ has died, Christ has risen, Christ will come again. For Augustine, the imperative work is what comes out of hearing the indicative statement of the gospel, namely repent and be baptized.[9] Therefore, Augustine must coherently explain how unregenerate man becomes regenerate man. Paul provides the theological statement that will allow Augustine to articulate his theology of calling.

On Nature and Grace

            The first work to be examined wherein Augustine used this text is his treatise On Nature and Grace, written in 415 AD. St. Jerome was also aware of the text as is cited in a letter to Pelagius himself. Jerome, having read On Nature and Grace, informed Pelagius of Augustine’s anti-Pelagian writings. However, Augustine never uses Pelagius’ name in the text, himself claiming he did not want to provoke Pelagius but merely to point out his particular mistakes in his writings. Augustine sent copies of On Nature and Grace, as well as Pelagius’ work, to Bishop John of Jerusalem and Pope Innocent in 417 AD.[10] In On Nature and Grace, Augustine provides his first anti-Pealgian orthodox theological statement. Augustine makes three specific points in the work, first that human nature is corrupted by Adam’s sin; second, grace is received ex opere operato[11] from baptism; lastly, “the whole massa damnata deserves punishment.”[12]

In On Nature and Grace Augustine considers the argument that man, from the light of nature, can obtain salvation without hearing the gospel. Augustine denies that this is possible; first, based on the Pauline statement that “faith comes by hearing” and secondly, that if man can obtain salvation then the death of Christ was logically of little or no value. Chapter 2 of On Nature and Grace can be divided into three parts: first, Augustine sets up the Pelagian argument; second, he presents the Pauline argument from Romans 10:17; and third, he concludes with a synthesis of the implications of the Pelagian argument being true and its effect on Christology and soteriology. Augustine formulates the Pelagian argument as one of justice:

• First, Assuming God is just
• Second, assuming that God creates the law of nature
• Third, assuming a man lives faithfully in accordance to the law of nature
• Then God would be unjust in condemning him

Augustine then asks rhetorically, “For God is not so unjust as to defraud righteous persons of the reward of righteousness…[f]or how could they believe what they have not heard of; or how could they hear without a preacher?”[13] Augustine, with a sort of tongue in cheek, quotes Romans 10:17, theoretically in support of the Pelagian position. Augustine then restates the Pelagian position as “but believe in God who made heaven and earth…and lead a right life, and thus accomplish his will uninstructed with any faith in the death and resurrection of Christ?” It is here that Augustine’s sarcasm comes to the top and he begins to put forth his theological argument as to why natural revelation is not effective to salvation; Augustine uses the whole argument of Paul in Romans 10.

In Romans 10, Paul discusses apparent soteriological difficulties in admitting Gentiles into the covenant. To address this issue Paul first examines faith coming from the heart, being professed with the mouth and through the life lived. Paul then determines there is no distinction between Gentile and Jew since “Everyone who calls on the name of the Lord will be saved.” (Rom 10:14 NRSV) Paul turns to the question “how are they to call on one in whom they have not believed?”[14] It is from the following text that Augustine draws out his argument against Pelagius. Paul declares that all have heard and all are left without excuse, both Jew and Gentile. Augustine’s argument here is if man can, based on natural revelation, be redeemed without faith in Christ, then Christ died in vain. He thus assumes that all men stand condemned under nature for their sin, and are aware that they fall short of redemption. Since, he argues, no one is without excuse, it follows that all are under the command to repent. In order to prove his point that natural law alone is incapable of salvation, Augustine compares it to the moral law by replacing law with nature in Galatians 2:21[15]. He renders the verse “If righteousness come by nature, then Christ died in vain.” Augustine concludes from this argument that man cannot be saved apart from faith, and that this faith comes from hearing the Gospel preached.

Rebuke and Grace

            In 427 AD, at a monastery in Hadrumetum, North Africa, a theological dispute broke out when some of the monks discovered a letter from Augustine concerning the Pelagian controversy. Some scholars believe this monastery had limited contact with the outside world given the length of time before the controversy arrived at the monastery. The letter from Augustine precipitated a theological debate at the monastery, eventually leading the abbot, Valentinus to send three monks to Augustine to seek out answers to the questions concerning Pelagianism. In response, Augustine wrote On Rebuke and Grace to Valentinus and the monks at Hadrumentum. In the letter, Augustine specifically deals with the theology of perseverance in grace as well as the topic of Romans 10:17.[16]

In chapter 11 of this book Augustine writes concerning backslidden Christians. He begins the chapter by reiterating the process for calling a member of the Church to repentance as outlined in Matthew 18. Augustine uses this discussion to move towards the doctrine of perseverance. He does this by considering the individual who has been rebuked [or called to repent] and was unresponsive. Augustine sets up an imaginary debate by a group who has been excommunicated and claim “We have not received perseverance.” Augustine asks the rhetorical question, if those who stand condemned by the sin of Adam cannot claim amnesty, as they had not heard the Gospel; neither can an individual who has heard the gospel claim they did not receive the “gift of perseverance.” Here Augustine analogically compares perseverance with hearing the Gospel. In On Rebuke and Grace, similar to On Nature and Grace, Augustine determines hearing the gospel is a necessary precondition for salvation. Without hearing the Gospel and professing Christ as Lord and Savior, no man can be saved for Augustine. In both of these circumstances Augustine deals with the question of those who stand condemned and how the hearing of the Gospel relates to salvation. In both cases Augustine determines man stands already condemned by the sin of Adam and that hearing the Gospel is a necessary precondition to salvation.

Textual Criticism of Romans 10:17

            Augustine understood hearing the gospel of Christ was a precondition to salvation. The Christological formulation of Augustine’s arguments in both On Rebuke and Grace and On Nature and Grace, as demonstrated above, rely on the Romans 10:17b’s reference to the “word of Christ.” Based on the two quotations of Romans 10:17 by Augustine, including Christ and not the more general “God,” it could be logically assumed that Augustine had access to manuscripts that used Christ specifically. In an interesting switch of circumstances, the oldest biblical texts end the verse with Χριστου, a direct reference to the Messiah.[17] The newer, and yet more traditional, Textus Receptus uses the more general word for God Θεοῦ.[18] Lastly, the Vulgate renders the word Christi, in line both with the scriptures Augustine would have had access to and the oldest witnesses.[19] Warfield translates Augustine’s citation of Romans 10:17 “faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of Christ.” Augustine had access mostly to the Old Latin version of the canon and slowly received Jerome’s Vulgate translation.[20] The Textus Receptus that fashions the last word Θεοῦ, comes from the”1550 edition of the Greek New Testament published by Robertus Stephanus.”[21] The Textus Recptus is similar, but not the same as, the Majority Text. In any case, contrary to the normative Higher Critical model of questioning references to Christ in earlier manuscripts, the Higher Critical approach and Augustine’s sources both agree “what is heard comes through the word of Christ.” (Rom 10:17, NRSV) The use of Χριστου is critical in understanding how Augustine uses the verse. The preceding verses (Romans 10:5ff) set out Paul’s logical argument that salvation is to both to the Jew and Gentile. Augustine then argues, based on the Gospel call to the Gentiles, that one must be able to hear in order to be saved. That salvation Augustine argues for is through the Χριστου, a much fuller doctrinal theology then if Augustine had used the more general Textus Receptus Θεοῦ. Augsutine’s arguments would not have had the same force had he not used these specific manuscripts. Within Pelagian theology, and specifically within the debate over natural revelation, if the text had read the “word of God” rather than “the word of Christ” it is possible that the Pelagians could have taken a different tact with the argument as outlined by Augustine. Furthermore, had the particular text read “the word of God” the specific Christological formulation as outlined by Augustine would not have been completely sound. In On Nature and Grace, Augustine is arguing that man cannot obtain salvation though natural revelation or else the death of Christ becomes essentially meaningless. If the text Augustine used read the general “God” as stated above, the argument breaks down. Specifically, within the context of how Augustine formulates his argument; the Pelagians could have argued that since the natural world is created and ordered by God, it would follow that the “word of God” would be demonstrable through creation itself. This would have been unacceptable to Augustine as his Christology only allows for salvation through faith in Christ.

Conclusion

Augustine’s use of Romans 10:17 demonstrates how he understands the ordo salutis. In Augustine’s use of the text, it is apparent that he understands the gospel call to repentance and faith as a critical element to salvation. Soteriologically, hearing the kerygma preached is the first step in salvation of the elect. Augustine demonstrates that it is only through faith in the propitiatory sacrifice of Christ that one may obtain salvation. Augustine’s use of the text allows him to bracket how salvation is obtained. Augustine’s Christological formation makes it clear that Christ is the only means whereby one may be redeemed and not counted as part of the massa damnata. As Salvation is only through faith in Christ, it follows for Augustine, natural revelation does not possess the properties to save. Moreover, Augustine argues, if faith developed solely on natural revelation were effective, then the death of Christ is not needed and the propitiatory sacrifice becomes null. If follows then, for Augustine, man is saved by hearing the gospel of Christ as the only means whereby man may be led to salvation.

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[1] Augustine of Hippo, Against Two Letters of Pelagius, 24, in Augustine: Anti-Pelagian Writings, trans. Benjamin Breckinridge Warfield, Peter Holmes, and Philip Schaff, Volume 5, (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1995), 414.

[2] Bruce Demarest, The Cross and Salvation (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2006), 212.

[3] Calvin L. Troup, Temporality, Eternity, and Wisdom: The Rhetoric of Augustine’s Confessions (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1999), 4-5.

[4] , Douglas J. Moo, The Epistle to the Romans (Grand Rapids, MI: W.B. Eerdmans Publishers, 1996), 666.

[5] Louis Berkhof, Principals of Biblical Interpretation (Grand Rapids, MI.: Baker Book House, 1950), 104.

[6] John Calvin, Commentary on Romans, 10:17, at Christian Classics Ethereal Library, http://www.ccel.org/

[7] Thomas Aquinas,  Lectures on the Letter to the Romans, Nova et Vetera, http://www.nvjournal.net/

[8] John of Damascus, Exposition On the Orthodox Faith, 4, in Nicene And Post-Nicene Fathers, ed. Phillip Schaff and Henry Wace, Volume 9 (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 2004), 79.

[9] Augustine of Hippo, Against Two Letters of Pelagius, 24, in Augustine: Anti-Pelagian Writings, trans. Benjamin Breckinridge Warfield, Peter Holmes, and Philip Schaff, Volume 5, (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1995), 414.

[10] Augustine of Hippo, On Nature and Grace, Vol 5, ed. Schaff, 117.

[11] Emmanuel J. Cutrone, “Sarcarments” in Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia, ed. Allan Fitzgerald and John C. Cavadini (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999), 745.

[12] Gerald Bonner “De Natura et Gratia” in Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia, ed. Allan Fitzgerald and John C. Cavadini (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999), 582.

[13] Augustine of Hippo, On Nature and Grace, Vol 5, ed. Schaff, 117.

[14] Ibid., 117.

[15] “I do not nullify the grace of God; for if justification comes through the law, then Christ died for nothing.” (Gal 2:21, NRSV)

[16] Gerald Bonner, “De Correptione et Gratia” in Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia, ed. Allan Fitzgerald and John C. Cavadini (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999), 245.

[17] Erwin Nestle, Barbara Aland, Kurt Aland, et al. eds. Novum Testamentum Graece. 27th ed. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesselschaft, 1993), 428.

[18] Novum Testamentum Graece, ed. Erwin Nestle, Barbara Aland, Kurt Aland, 423.

[19] Biblia sacra iuxta Vulgatam versionem, ed. Bonifatius Fischer, Robert Weber et al., 3rd ed. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1969), 1762.

[20] Mark Vessey, “Jerome” in Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia, ed. Allan Fitzgerald and John C. Cavadini (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999), 461.

[21] Douglas Kutilek, Westcott & Hort vs. Textus Receptus: Which Is Superior? at Bible Research, http://www.bible-researcher.com/kutilek1.html